Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Games with fuzzy permission structure: A conjunctive approach
A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function which determines the maximal gain or minimal cost that every subset of players can achieve when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions that the other players take. A permission structure over the set of players describes a hierarchical organization where there are players who need permission from certain ...
متن کاملAxiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure
In games with a permission structure it is assumed that players in a cooperative transferable utility game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. We provide axiomatic characterizations of Banzhaf permission values being solutions that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to modified TU-ga...
متن کاملSharing a polluted river
A river carries pollutants to people living along it if it is polluted. To make the water in the river clean, some costs are incurred. This poses a question of how to split the costs of cleaning the whole river among the agents located along it. To answer this question, we resort to the two main advocated doctrines in international disputes: the theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) ...
متن کاملSharing a polluted river network∗
A number of agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) are connected to a river network. Some agents are located upstream and some downstream. Upstream agents pollute the river network. To clean up the polluted river network, costs are incurred, and they are shared among the agents. In allocating these costs, the upstream-downstream relationship between agents has to be taken ...
متن کاملComment on ‘Sharing a polluted river’
In Ni and Wang (2007) two solutions are given to determine the division of the cost of cleaning a river among the agents located along the river. For each solution the authors give three different motivations, namely (i) an axiomatic characterization, (ii) the solution is the Shapley value of an appropriately defined cooperative TU-game, and (iii) the solution belongs to the Core of the associa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.005