Political Legitimacy as a Problem of Judgment

This paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit views of judgment. Three claims are advanced. First, salient opposition among is not “moralism” “realism.” Recent realist proposals for rethinking share with moralist a distinctive form, called “normativism”: quest knowledge principles that solve question legitimacy. assumes judging matter applying such case at hand. Second, neither Rawls nor Habermas normativist about The they proffer claim express rather than adjudicate liberal-democratic regime, thus cannot fundamental level. But perhaps we should aspiration theoretically resolving problem begin with. My third “pragmatist” approach enables us rethink more deeply shifting focus from articulation activity judging. Implicit in Rawls’s Habermas’s theories I then find clues towards an alternative account judgment, which calls theoretical resolution but ongoing practical engagement.