Political Economy of Redistribution

Political Economy of Redistribution∗

It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in the society makes property better protected from expropriation. We use a legislative bargainingtype model to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the eq...

political economy of china in central asia

this research is about the political economy of china in central asia. in this research the political & economic interactions affected on chinas political economy in central asia are examined. chinas goal of presence in central asia including political-security, economic and energy goals is described in one part. in another part, the trade relations between china and central asian countries ar...

The Political Economy of Redistribution under Democracy∗

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. H...

The Political Economy of Religion , Individual Liberties , and Redistribution

In this paper we study the role of religiosity in political choices such as redistribution and individual liberties. To a standard model with consumption and effort, we add a third good: civil liberties with a cap established by law. More liberties, like divorce, abortion, gender parity, or gay marriage, may be considered good by the secular and detrimental by the religious individuals. With st...

The Shifting Political Economy of Redistribution in the Indian Federation