Political disagreement and information in elections
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Political disagreement and information in elections
We study the role of re-election concerns in the incentives of incumbent parties to engage in policy experimentation. In a probabilistic voting model, candidates representing two groups of voters compete for o ce. In equilibrium, the candidate representing the majority group wins with a probability that increases in the degree of political disagreement — the di↵erence in expected payo↵s from th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.009