Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian-Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium.∗
In general rational expectations equilibrium (RES), as introduced in [12] in an ArrowDebreu-McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game [3]. The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are suppo...
متن کاملRational Expectations in Games
Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. Inter alia, this theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value—what rational players should expect to get. Almost 80 years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic question of value is concerned. To be sure, we do have equilibrium theories: the...
متن کاملPredicting the Unpredictable: Forecastable Bubbles and Business Cycles under Rational Expectations
A popular interpretation of the Rational Expectations/Efficient Markets hypothesis states that, if it holds, market valuations must follow a random walk; hence, the hypothesis is frequently criticized on the basis of empirical evidence against such a prediction. Yet this reasoning incurs what we could call the ‘fallacy of probability diffusion symmetry’: although market efficiency does indeed i...
متن کاملLearning Within Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the “true” structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative learning model is presented where agents’ decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy...
متن کاملAmbiguity and rational expectations equilibria∗
This paper proves the existence and robustness of partially-revealing rational expectations equilibria (REE) when this equilibrium concept is expanded to allow for some agents to have preferences that display ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, the generic existence of fullyrevealing REE is proven for a commonly-used subset of the class of ambiguity averse preferences. This finding illustrates tha...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLOS ONE
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0203390