Political contestability and public contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
“Political connections, corruption, and privatization of public services: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain”
Political corruption is a type of market failure. One area of public policy where corruption is relatively common is the contracting out of public services. Private firms can improve their chances of obtaining contracts by bribing politicians or public servants and funding political parties. In the same vein, firms can gain access to policy makers by hiring influential former politicians –a pra...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12325