Political consensus, economic reforms, and democratic transitions in the Middle East: Evidence from voting on Tunisian reform bills

This study investigates the role of political consensus in accelerating economic reforms and finds a significant negative effect on speed reform votes parliament Tunisia. We analyze number days until bill was adopted to identify causal reforms. Using an endogenous treatment model original database between 2012 2019 Tunisia, we compare social with before after consensus. find that is more likely delay than driven mainly by informal mechanisms created instability prevailed agreement. The findings indicate had subversive democratic institutions Tunisia creating processes reduced public oversight, transparency, law enforcement. Gazdar, Kaouthar, Rihab Grassa, M. Kabir Hassan. 2021. “The Development Islamic Finance Arab Spring: Does Political Islam Matter?” Politics & Policy 49(3): 682–707. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12408. Khodair, Amany Ahmed, Mostafa E. AboElsoud, Mahmoud Khalifa. 2019. Role Regional Media Shaping Awareness Youth: Evidence from Egypt.” 47(6): 1095–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12335. Sarquís, David J. 2012. “Democratization Case Egypt's Transition.” 40(5): 871–903. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00381.x. Este estudio investiga el papel del consenso político en la aceleración de las reformas económicas y encontró un efecto negativo significativo velocidad los votos reforma parlamento Túnez. Analizamos número días hasta que se aprobó proyecto para identificar sobre reformas. Usando modelo tratamiento endógeno una base datos entre Túnez, comparamos sociales con políticas antes después consenso. Descubrimos es más probable retrase políticas. impulsado principalmente por mecanismos informales creados inestabilidad política prevaleció acuerdo. Los hallazgos indicaron tuvo subversivo instituciones democráticas Túnez al crear procesos redujeron supervisión pública, transparencia aplicación ley. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2012??2019??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? concept part cooperative behavior compromise literature. It may be used resolve some obstacles new transitions (Haggard Kaufman, 2018). New democracies face high distributive pressure actors uncertainty due turbulence. Because sequencing compensating fiscal transfers are key factors extensive support for reforms, might encourage discussion cooperation among different (Acemoglu Robinson, 2001; Black et al., 2000). In particular, critical addressing problems increasing intra-elite popular compliance (Bunce, 2001). Making pact also has advantage reducing enhancing legitimacy implementation capacity bridging continuity bureaucratic personnel involving process (Przeworski, 1993). brings all relevant players table, including those who have effective veto, discuss how each group will benefit packages. However, search limit changes both politics economics, especially context continuing fragmented party systems 1995). addition, there real risk susceptibility collusion supporting promote rent-seeking subject power games undertaken ruling elite (Alexeev, 1999; 2000; Polishchuk, Putnam, 1992). dynamics its examines failure regular advance their since Spring 2011. investigated whether helped legislature vote bills overcome conflicts. compared this understand variation incentives constraints relative type resulting policy outcomes. rather synonym or agreement facilitates decision-making coalition. stimulates arrangements government settings through power-sharing cooperation. creates compromises around difficult impossible achieve processes. Our hypothesis draws well-established economy literature reform. focused importance distribution making it affects (see World Bank, 2017). A greater inclusion associated higher level cooperation, participate comply agreements Furthermore, multiparty system and, interaction government, opposition, unions, important explaining success implementing (Alesina Drazen, 1991; Ganghof, 2006; Katzenstein, 1985; Lijphart, 1984; Luebbert, Tsebelis, 2011). near-majority willing opposition pass presence militant unions adversarial types (Green-Pedersen, 2002; 1984, 1986; Schludi, 2005). insights mainstream science, investigating informal1 formal institutions. examined as irregular mechanism reinforce subvert Consensus lowering information costs streamlining co-decision making. But can stimulating corruption, clientelism, patrimonialism (Helmke Levitsky, 2004, 2006). To test our hypothesis, regressed needed using two periods 2016 argue Tunisian “Carthage Agreement” consequent negatively impacted implementation. While affected lesser extent, decelerating severe. presents arguments explain reasons mitigated results. generated following voting bills. suffer absence strategy does not help manage competing interests accelerate contributes providing about preconditions required make opportunity implement chance escape accountability control agenda only coalition's benefit. contribution attributes institutional efficiency system. Similar Haggard Kaufman (1995) Bunce (2001), conclude that, under fragile institutions, stability economics politics. knowledge, novel empirical concerning Middle East, comparative reform, capitalist advancing outcomes, regimes, shape policy, arena impact change. which influence triggers competition process. remainder article organized follows. next section, Journey Tunisia,” provides background “Conceptual Framework: Contrast Reforms versus Economic Reforms” argument regarding improved transition but failed enhance transition. subsequent section discusses data descriptive statistics. “Capturing Effect Consensus: Empirical Design Results” design results study. “Potential Mechanisms” potential channel consensus-impact propagation. Finally, last recommendations concluding remarks. After revolution, landscape became highly fragmented. insufficient posed substantial barrier passing most parliament's led Ennahda candidates Jbali then Laarayedh suffered turmoil. majorities coalitions, coupled frequent movement deputies blocs, impeded obtaining simple majority (Kubinec Grewal, 2018; Yerkes Ben Yahmed, 2019). Moreover, aftermath 2010 revolution influenced degree polarization camps, whose composition varied over time. One camp Ennahda, whereas another comprised secular parties, figures old regime, business elite, human rights groups, activists, labor unions. October 2013, national dialogue marked beginning aimed at overcoming serious deterioration environment; discord rivals could civil strife (Murray Stigant, served contain assassination consequences, where accused facilitating leaders, investigations were dropped President Essebsi (Grewal Hamid, attenuate waves demonstrations strong demands engulfed country. These protests supported society organizations, put 2015 (Bishara, 2021). politically motivated socioeconomic surged 2015–2016 protests. radical change concerned form protests, violent before, blockade sit-ins instances violence (Vatthauer Weipert-Fenner, Protests decentralized participants acted within independent movements such “the Movement Renewal” (Ettajdid) Union Unemployed Graduates (UDC). protestors did partner organizations General Labour (UGTT), contradict UGTT's UGTT continued act locally regional sectoral defending salary increases, organization criticized. formally translated into pact, Carthage Agreement, July 13, 2016. signed main Nidaa Tounes several formations four employers' union (UTICA). endorsed security structural strategies coming period (McCarthy, stipulated formation “national unity”2 Prime Minister Youssef Chahed creation, first time, “Ministry Major Reforms.” From perspective, perceived external shock hit triggered First, widened coalition time include nine major parties three organizations. Tounes, winning 2014 election (86 chairs 217), chose compose rival (69 seats) broad unity accounting 82% parliamentary (179 chairs), divided context. earlier coalitions established just revolution; included antagonistic preferred sharing prevent severe cleavage. consisted 41 ministers, 31 ministers previous governments. Second, inside parliament. For example, given maintained coordination meetings ad hoc committees head government. Third, government's explicitly highlighting reforms3 Ministry Notably, turmoil without necessarily resolving conflicts legislative level. remained parliament, efforts establish stable during complete cycle fell short enough terms internal hence, fragmentation roll-call measure activity performance declined Agreement. delays legislation observed existing tries answer question why mostly adopted, considerably delayed abandoned. describes stimulated Theoretically, expected decelerate mechanisms. layer validation, conflictual committee stimulate reduce sustainability Specifically, unit intended took systematically establishing projects4 them plenary session. Often, projects ended commission rejected clear policy5 decision attendance6 even further. Besides, complex because they technical addition nature committee. As result, either possibility finding dispatching consensus, causing confirms showing constrained 1995) successful requires consolidation governance (Marawall, 1993; Yashar, 1998). second shows explains few suggested committees. one project discussed 2017–2018, five 2016–2017. transversal responsible delaying Beji Caid Essebsi, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, mobilized At priority, challenging negotiate questions affect ability (as developed Dewatripont Roland, common ground. constitutional many others areas transitional justice, rights, electoral law, legal immunity, policy.7 nonconsensual ease tensions dismantle obstacles,8 hindering validation constitution other agreements, chapter 1959 Islam,9 facilitated justice law. Although validated consensual They lack majority, underlines essential building majority. instance, reach adopt decentralization agree oversee municipal elections decentralize power, 2018. elect members Supreme Court Council twice Candidate Nahdha Abdellatif Bouazizi 145 votes, his nonadoption life represented Kais Said suspend halt contrast, path completely different, accommodate investment protection personal banking sector pension state-owned enterprise (Jouini, Some passed international financial (IFIs) funding laws. Reform offset vision, followed well-constructed plans instability. no privatization should enterprises privatized first. situation worse dismantling monopolistic structures, port services tobacco, commerce distribution. state limited developing reasonable compensation 1992; Williamson, 1994).10 space fallen meeting redistribution regime's victims people adversely budget finance employment departures sector, recapitalization enterprises, analysis revealed poor, group, benefited poverty 5% 2015. middle class rich disadvantaged (Jouini profound implications veto most, gained process.11 Most proposed measures seriously class, servants employees increase contributions. augmentation wealth connected entrepreneurs smugglers makes justify any targeting classes.12 proposals opaque selective approach, instead engaging stakeholders thorough (Muasher 2016). Despite being agreement, workers' (UGTT) employer's (UTICA) diverging views freezing wages, taxation, adoption independence central bank, codes 2016, withdrew wage freezing, subsidies example demonstrates transparency participation denounced duplicity, evident letter sent International Monetary Fund, commitment compulsory nonoptional retirement age. specified amendments initiative parliamentarians, optional age cannot deficit problem. 2019, version extension 62 years 65 years, increases imbalances. assesses validation. accelerated dependent variable study, phase. choice fact phase based determinants. conceptualizing ministry depended determinants available. list includes 468 submitted noteworthy presented processed according specific timetable set Parliament Bureau. exercise, recorded session adopted. explanatory variables dichotomous variable, CONSENSUS, mark value 1 0 strategic underwent scenarios, depending date check robustness complexity quantify articles project. specification dummy record status still delayed. differentiate political, social, economic. eliminate induce progress, aggregate nature, annual variables, growth rate inflation. capture improvement attributable situation, characteristics cycle. corruption dataset collected Al Bawsala, non-governmental defends citizen empowerment enabling monitoring elected representatives makers' activities. primary provided encountered, articles, theme, Additional sources database. terrorism index taken worldwide indicators. Bawsala website13 complemented total laws voted (laws). gross domestic product (GDP) inflation retrieved Indicators (WDI) Budget accounted 30% 100% acceptance. Other constituted 13% Social 13%. 20%, thus quantity. Transversal 15% total, 8%. Table summarizes average, standard deviation, minimum, maximum values significance differences pre- post-consensus periods. it. declining trend reached, except single increased reached. All (laws), balanced shown mean difference 1. quality depth it, unbalanced periods, indicated conditions deteriorated14 averages significant. causality effect, employed measuring successfully validate calculated deposit Ceteris paribus, above average equal while nonadopted because: first, allows unobservable interfere reforms; second, reflect stakeholders' discussing draft, leadership capacity, unavailable Jouini Rajhi, 2021); finally, focus helps us passage barriers assessed Therefore, eliminating endogeneity resolved achieving predictive power. investigate relationship observable