Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance
The subject of government bank regulation is intimately intertwined with that of government deposit insurance. If the government is to insure bank deposits, it should also have some say in the risks that insured banks are allowed to take, otherwise it would leave itself wide open to unlimited potential losses. John H. Kareken (in this issue) comes close to arguing that banks without government ...
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Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of Deposit Insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of market power in this financial segment. This ...
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This paper analyzes the investment decisions of insured banks under fixed-rate deposit insurance. The model takes into account the charter value and allows banks to dynamically revise their asset portfolios. Trade-offs exist between preserving the charter and exploiting deposit insurance. The optimal bank portfolio problem is solved analytically for a constant charter value. In any audit period...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Stability
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1572-3089
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2015.01.004