Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Conservatism: Theory with an Application to Iran
New monetary literatures widely concentrates on the importance of institutional arrangements in the effectiveness of monetary policy. The debate regarding the optimal institutional design of central banks, independence and conservatism are usually considered to be the most important ingredients for a stable and successful monetary policy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to deal with the...
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Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Ove...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00115