Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector
Firms lobby the U.S. Congress to in uence policy-making. This paper quanti es the extent to which lobbying expenditures a ect policy enactment. First, I construct a novel dataset comprised of federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. Second, I develop and estimate a gametheoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditu...
متن کاملPolicy In uence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector
In this paper, I quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by rms a ect policy enactment. To achieve this end, I construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. I then develop and estimate a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to a ect the probability th...
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پس ازفروپاشی شوروی،رشد منابع نفت و گاز، آسیای میانه و قفقاز را در یک بازی ژئوپلتیکی انرژی قرار داده است. با در نظر گرفتن این منابع هیدروکربنی، این منطقه به یک میدانجنگ و رقابت تجاری برای بازی های ژئوپلتیکی قدرت های بزرگ جهانی تبدیل شده است. روسیه منطقه را به عنوان حیات خلوت خود تلقی نموده و علاقمند به حفظ حضورش می باشد تا همانند گذشته گاز طبیعی را به وسیله خط لوله مرکزی دریافت و به عنوان یک واس...
15 صفحه اولLobbying for Power: A Structural Model of Lobbying in the Energy Sector∗
Firms systematically lobby the U.S. Congress to in uence policy-making. To what extent do lobbying expenditures a ect the probability that a policy is enacted? What are the private returns from lobbying expenditures? To answer these questions, I construct a novel dataset comprised of federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress (2007 2008). A...
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In this paper, we statistically estimate the returns to lobbying by universities. We develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks to motivate our empirical work. We first show that universities that are represented by a House Appropriations Committee (HAC) or Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) member spend more on lobbying. Next, in a later instrumental var...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv029