Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-reductive Physicalism
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1879-4912,1879-4920
DOI: 10.1007/s13194-011-0041-7