Platform Governance in the Presence of Within-Complementor Interdependencies: Evidence from the Rideshare Industry

Existing studies suggest that platform access restriction may cause restricted complementors to switch competing platforms, which will increase complement quantity on platforms. We re-examine this prediction by accounting for the impact of economies scope complementor responses restriction. argue restricting a complementor’s prevent it from achieving multi-homing, thereby incentivizing abandon both and (unrestricted) Using rideshare data in New York City, we compare numbers trips made Lyft Uber drivers, respectively, before after drivers’ its platform. find Lyft’s reduced trip not only but also Uber. In addition, Uber’s decreased during low-demand periods (e.g., non-rush hours) unrestricted high-demand rush hours). contrast, substantial number multi-homing drivers left platforms following restriction, subsequent led an Lyft. These results highlight importance interdependencies across activities when designing governance policies. This paper was accepted Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Funding: H. D. Chung acknowledges support Strategic Research Foundation’s Dissertation [Grant SRF-2021-DRG-8363]. Supplemental Material: The files online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4706 .