منابع مشابه
Rational play and rational beliefs under uncertainty
Alternating-time temporal logic (atl) is one of the most influential logics for reasoning about agents’ abilities. Constructive Strategic Logic (csl) is a variant of atl for imperfect information games that allows to express strategic and epistemic properties of coalitions under uncertainty. In this paper, we propose a logic that extends csl with a notion of plausibility that can be used for re...
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This is a book, both comprehensive and thought-provoking, with a timely thesis that is a “must read” for anyone interested in human behavior and our collective future. Matthew Blakeway takes the view that our brains are biological computers with algorithms for action. But what if the algorithms are based on faulty data? What if our actions, based on our beliefs, are a product of causal circular...
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This is a chapter in a new series of Handbooks in Financial Economics entitled “Dynamics and Evolution of Financial Markets.” It explores works which contribute to explaining market dynamics and volatility by employing models of rational but diverse beliefs. This excludes models of Behavioral Economics. We explore models that permit endogenous amplification which can, in turn, explain such basi...
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Traditional decision theory has assumed that agents have complete, consistent, and readily available beliefs and preferences. Obviously, even if an expert system has complete and consistent beliefs, it cannot have them readily available. Moreover, some beliefs about beliefs are not even approximately computable. It is shown that if all players have complete and consistent beliefs, they can comp...
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In this paper I scrutinize the concept of “rational belief” in the notion of rationalizability in strategic form games. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of the concept of “rational belief”. I show that a point-rationalizable strategy can be supported by a “rational belief” and,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Principia: an international journal of epistemology
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1808-1711,1414-4247
DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p451