Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalised medicine: Experimental evidence

We study physicians’ incentives to use personalised medicine techniques, replicating the physician’s trade-offs under option of information. In a laboratory experiment conducted in two French Universities, prospective physicians played real-effort game. vary both information structure (free access versus paid information) and payment scheme (pay-for-performance (P4P), capitation (CAP) fee-for-service (FFS)), implementing within-subject design. Our results are threefold: (i) Compared FFS CAP, P4P strongly positively impacts decision adopt medicine. (ii) Although expected dominate other schemes, is not always efficient transforming free into higher quality care. (iii) When it has be for after controlling self-selection, associated with quality, suggesting that subjects tend make better comes at cost. find this effect stronger males than females physicians. Quantification our however suggests positive impact strong enough justify generalising access. Finally, we develop theoretical model includes its set-up commitment device component, which mechanism inferred from data experiment. replicates principal experiment, reinforcing interpretation provided by who bought can interpreted as effect.