Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Demonstratives as individual concepts
Using a version of situation semantics, this article argues that bare and complex demonstratives are interpreted as individual concepts.
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In ‘‘Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account’’ (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work, I lay out the...
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It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation e...
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Some contemporary discussion about the explanation of consciousness substantially recapitulates a decisive debate about reference, knowledge, and justification from an earlier stage of the analytic tradition. In particular, I argue that proponents of a recently popular strategy for accounting for an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts — the so-called ‘phenomenal concept strate...
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Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. In this paper, I want to explore an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Res Philosophica
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2168-9105
DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1991