Perturbed finitely repeated games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolution in Finitely Repeated Games of Common Interest Evolution in Finitely Repeated Games of Common Interest
I apply a version of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (Econometrica, 1993) and Young's (Econometrica, 1993) evolutionary dynamic to nitely repeated games of common interest. The dynamic is modi ed by allowing mutations to a ect only o path beliefs. I nd that repetition within a match leads agents to sacri ce current payo s in order to increase payo s in later stages. As a consequence, evolution leads t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.002