Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion with a Privately Informed Receiver
We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion framework in a finite horizon setting consisting of a Seller and a Buyer. The Seller wishes to persuade the Buyer to buy a durable good at a given price by providing information about its relevance (match quality). The Buyer has private information about his valuation for a good match and we study optimal dynamic information policies employed by the Seller...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2913916