Personal taxation, corporate agency costs and firm performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency Model of the Firm
Recent empirical studies of dividend taxation have found that: (1) dividend tax cuts cause large, immediate increases in dividend payouts, and (2) the increases are driven by firms with high levels of share ownership among top executives or the board of directors. These findings are inconsistent with existing theories of dividend taxation. We show that an agency model in which managers and shar...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv3i1c1p4