Periodic Strategies and Rationalizability in Perfect Information 2-Player Strategic Form Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Periodic Strategies and Rationalizability in Perfect Information 2-Player Strategic Form Games
We define and study periodic strategies in 2-player finite strategic form games. and exploit their connection to non-Nash rationalizable strategies. The result of our findings is that, non-Nash rationalizable strategies are always periodic, but periodic strategies are not necessarily rationalizable. Non-cooperative game theory [1, 2] has developed to be the most useful tool in strategic decisio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Physics: Conference Series
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1742-6596
DOI: 10.1088/1742-6596/410/1/012070