Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games∗
This paper studies equilibrium selection in binary supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. We provide complete characterizations of absorbing and globally accessible equilibria and apply them to two subclasses of games. First, for unanimity games, it is shown that our selection criterion is not in agreement with that in terms of Nash products, and an example is presented in whic...
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In perfect foresight dynamics, an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will always choose the action is self-fulfilling. A symmetric game is a PIM game if an opponent’s particular action maximizes the incentive of an action, independently of the rest of the players. This class includes supermodular games, games with linear incentives and so forth. We show that, in PIM games, lin...
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This paper investigates absorption and global accessibility under perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives. An action distribution in the society is absorbing if there is no equilibrium path escaping from the distribution, and globally accessible if, from every initial distribution, there exists an equilibrium path which converges to the distribution. Using time symmetry of th...
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These notes develop the theory of supermodular games. Supermodular games are those characterized by “strategic complementarities” – roughly, this means that when one player takes a higher action, the others want to do the same. Supermodular games are interesting for several reasons. First, they encompass many applied models. Second, they have the remarkable property that many solution concepts ...
متن کاملDaisuke Oyama
This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. Each agent forms his belief about the future evolution of the action distribution in the society, and takes an action that maxi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1742-7355
DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00162.x