Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games
We show that perfect monitoring is not necessarily the optimal monitoring technology in repeated games, unless players are both patient and have access to a mediator who can condition her recommendations on the entire history of actions and recommendations. This claim follows from three results. First, players can be better o¤ with unmediated imperfect (public or private) monitoring than with m...
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I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player’s payoff depends on his own and his neighbors’ actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, priva...
متن کاملCommunication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer’s (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this ...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
We present a relatively general model of repeated games first, which will be later specialized for each different repeated game with different monitoring structure. Stage game is a standard strategic (normal) form game G = {N,A, g} , where N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, Ai is player i’s finite or compact action set ¡ A = Q i∈N Ai ¢ , and g : A→ <n is the payoff functions of n players...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
In this note, we study an another information structure, imperfect public monitoring. In this class of model, players cannot observe the other players’ actions directly, but can observe imperfect and public signals about them. There are at least two reasons why this information structure is worth special attention. First, it is simply a more reasonable assumption than perfect monitoring in some...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005