Perfect Capital Mobility and Optimal Monetary Policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy
We examine optimal monetary policy under prevailing Chinese policies – including capital controls, nominal exchange rate targets, and costly sterilization of foreign capital inflows. China’s combination of capital controls and exchange rate pegs disrupts its monetary policy, precluding adjustments that could maintain macroeconomic stability following a set of shocks that mirror its experience d...
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Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Integration
سال: 1989
ISSN: 1225-651X,1976-5525
DOI: 10.11130/jei.1989.4.2.50