Perceptual grouping for war and peace

In international conflicts a land power is motivated to wage wars for expansion, but engaging in an enduring war costly. Therefore, the decision of and peace ultimate importance has been studied intensively under game theory by analyzing pay-offs different actions. Regarding such tension, we demonstrate that perceptual grouping, although completely irrelevant those pay-offs, can nevertheless provide salient visual common sense as mutually acknowledged ‘rallying point’. it significantly reduces between powers, facilitating around border groups. To prove this, designed two-player which highlights three fundamental principles competition. Players’ wealth increases with expansion lands. However, expensive even winner. Troops consume more supplies they march away from capital. goal not annihilate opponent acquire maximum wealth. Participants were divided into two One played battlefield groups marked colors, while other’s homochromatic without grouping. The colors rules game. Compared non-perceptual-grouping condition, accumulated perceptual-grouping condition lower frequency battle, indicating eased tension overall. Players inclined withdraw their troops frontline mutual benefits, manifesting weaker attack intention reducing cost supplies. This effect largely implicit almost all participants failed report influence color on decisions. Our findings strong evidence grouping purely phenomenon complex human conflicts. It suggests equilibrium powers world may be implicitly subtly influenced humans’ territory.