Percent plans, automatic admissions, and college outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Decentralized College Admissions
We study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences. Colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below. When students’ attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weight on...
متن کاملfor “ Decentralized College Admissions ”
where the the last inequality holds since mA(s) < mA(1) for s < 1. Note that A benefits from the deviation since it admits more students without exceeding its capacity. Similarly, if mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting mA(0) − κ of students. Thus, we must have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) in equilibrium. Step 2. In equilibrium, there is a unique ŝi ∈ (0, 1), for i = A,B, such that mi(ŝi) = κ. Proof...
متن کاملNeighborhood context and college plans.
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متن کاملThe College Admissions Problem Reconsidered
This paper revisits the college admissions problem and studies the efficiency, incentive, and monotonicity for colleges. We show that max-min criterion that is stronger than substitutability, together with the quota-saturability that requires having enough acceptable applicants, guarantees weak Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness for colleges under the colleges-proposing deferred acceptanc...
متن کاملCollege admissions with affirmative action
This paper first shows that when colleges’ preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges’ preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-spe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IZA Journal of Labor Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2193-8997
DOI: 10.1186/2193-8997-3-10