Perceived Risk and Deterrence: Methodological Artifacts in Perceptual Deterrence Research
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Attacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game
In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker. The optimal defense involves the randomization of scarce security resources, yet how attackers perceive the risk given randomized defense is not well understood. We conducted an experiment where attackers chose whether to attack or not attack targets protected by randomized defense s...
متن کاملAttacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game.
In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker. The optimal defense involves the randomization of scarce security resources, yet how attackers perceive the risk given randomized defense is not well understood. We conducted an experiment where attackers chose whether to attack or not attack targets protected by randomized defense s...
متن کاملUncertainty and entry deterrence*
We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deter rence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence ...
متن کاملLearning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research
Public policy and scientific knowledge concerning deterrence have long been marching in different directions. Despite the proliferation of threestrikes, mandatory minimum, and concealed weapons laws and retention of capital punishment in 37 states, there is little credible evidence that changes in sanctions affect crime rates, and there is no credible evidence that capital punishment deters bet...
متن کاملResidual Deterrence ∗
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-)
سال: 1982
ISSN: 0091-4169
DOI: 10.2307/1143192