PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12015