منابع مشابه
Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter’s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disp...
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I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access to legislators is costly then interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to p...
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Conventional models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that when there are multiple district elections for a legislature we get back to a world where the median voter matters: an extreme policy will generally only come about if it is preferred by the median voter in a majority o...
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The paper applies a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation methodology to scale roll call votes in the 35 and 38 Canadian Parliaments over a multidimensional policy space. The results clearly demonstrate that policy debates are two-dimensional in Canada. The first dimension represents the classical division between the governing and the opposition parties that has been found in similar Pa...
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We experimentally investigate the Jackson-Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods including “strange bedfellow” coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome no...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1945-7782,1945-7790
DOI: 10.1257/app.20180286