Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Payoff Information and Self - Confirming Equilibrium
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents’ payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the eq...
متن کاملPayoff Information and Self - Confirming Equilibrium 1
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents’ payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the eq...
متن کاملSelf-confirming Equilibrium
A self-con rming equilibrium is the answer to the following question: what are the possible limiting outcomes of purposeful interactions among a collection of adaptive agents, each of whom averages past data to approximate moments of the conditional probability distributions of interest? If outcomes converge, a Law of Large Numbers implies that agents' beliefs about conditional moments become c...
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Why is public information revealed? We endogeneize public information by modeling aggregate information release, in games of large populations with anonymous matching, as a rational, utility-maximizing choice. We assume that there is a “planner”, who knows and selectively reveals aggregate information, in order to maximize his objective function. we show that public information can affect indiv...
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Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steadystates of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are “self-destroying” as a player’s representation of the game must change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensiveform...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2576