Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Payment schemes in infinite - horizon experimental games ∗
We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the Cumulative and the Last period payment...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y