Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs are Low
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agency Models of Executive Compensation
We would like to thank Kenneth Judd and Madhav Rajan for their helpful comments.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.927081