Pay to activate service in vacation queues

We study a vacation queueing model where an arriving customer, upon finding the server to be on vacation, is offered opportunity pay fee instantaneously end server's which referred as pay-to-activate-service (PTAS). If no one utilizes PTAS, service will automatically resume when system's workload reaches critical level. investigate customers' equilibrium strategies: (i) joining or balking and (ii) if joining, accepting PTAS rejecting in response such mechanism; we show that strategies exhibit both avoid-the-crowd (ATC) follow-the-crowd (FTC) types of behavior. Our results indicate adoption efficient improving system performance (e.g., revenue throughput) demand volume intermediate. also discover that, selecting appropriate queue-length information disclosure policy, provider has trade off between collecting higher through throughput, because revealing impact aforementioned two metrics opposing directions. Finally, compare our new setting other common mechanisms including regular queues pay-for-priority queues.