Pay me Right: Reference Values and Executive Compensation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
1 Pay me Right : Reference values
The increasing disparity between executive compensation and firm performance, and outrageously high compensation levels has stimulated discussions on introduction of some form of pay regulation. The implications of such systems are however poorly understood. In this paper we investigate a specific case of introduction of executive remuneration Code in Slovenia, which provides some interesting i...
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Detailed information on how rms structure base salary, bonus payments and total compensation is drawn from a data set of more than 500 rms between 1981-1988. This data is merged with personnel records of the rms top executives to investigate the relationship between executive compensation and rm pay policies. I nd that the rm pay policies have a strong e¤ect on compensation even when con...
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Scholars frequently argue whether the sharp rise in chief executive officer (CEO) pay in recent years is “efficient” or is a consequence of “rent extraction” because of the failure of corporate governance in individual firms. This article argues that governance failure must be conceptualized at the market rather than the firm level because excessive pay increases for even relatively few CEOs a ...
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We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets. ∗ We wo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Financial Management
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1354-7798
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036x.2010.00558.x