Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player is not too concerned about inequity aversion. Second, we demonstrate that in the infinitely repeated vers...
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A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the form frequently a...
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This paper presents a machine-learning approach to modeling human behavior in one-shot games. It provides a framework for representing and reasoning about the social factors that affect people’s play. The model predicts how a human player is likely to react to different actions of another player, and these predictions are used to determine the best possible strategy for that player. Data collec...
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For matrix games we study how small nonzero probability must be used in optimal strategies. We show that for n × n win-lose-draw games (i.e. (−1, 0, 1) matrix games) nonzero probabilities smaller than n are never needed. We also construct an explicit n × n win-lose game such that the unique optimal strategy uses a nonzero probability as small as n. This is done by constructing an explicit (−1, ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g3010056