Patent Litigation Insurance

Patent Litigation and the Role of Enforcement Insurance

We study the effects of patent enforcement insurance when used by an incumbent patent holder in order to increase its incentives to oppose alleged infringers (entrants). By covering some of the legal costs ex-ante, the incumbent can increase its commitment to litigate and, as a result, deter some potential entrants and, in case of entry, induce a more profitable settlement deal. We find that it...

Predatory patent litigation

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The Patent Litigation Explosion

This paper provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 80s and 90s. Consistent with our model, litigation is more likely when prospective defendants spend more on R&D, when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents and when firms are larger and technologically close. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more...

Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes

The Private Costs of Patent Litigation

This paper estimates the total cost of patent litigation. We use a large sample of stock market event studies around the date of lawsuit filings for US public firms from 1984-99. Even though most lawsuits settle, we find that the total costs of lawsuits are large compared to estimated legal fees, estimates of patent value, and R&D spending. By the late 1990s, alleged infringers bore expected co...