Passive Shareholders as a Takeover Defense

The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value

We study the role of takeover threats as a corporate control mechanism using [Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29] model of formal and real authority. Shareholders do not monitor the manager’s actions since ownership is widely dispersed. A corporate raider may monitor and step in if a profit opportunity exists. In our ...

Takeover Defense When Financial Markets are (Only) Relatively Efficient

Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors

The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders’ supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder’ interests by...

Review on Passive Defense Legal Requirements in Territorial Planning

Nowadays, given different definitions and conceptions on development, territorial planning lends to for various economic, social and geographical aspects, however its defensive and security perspectives have been taken into account to less extent. The present research is aimed to specify passive defense legal requirements in Territorial planning through outlining the most important rules on pas...

Shareholders Should Welcome Employees as Directors

The most influential theory of corporate governance, principal agency theory, does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder interests by making the bo...