Party Positions, Asset Ownership, and Economic Voting

Decoupling Economic Ownership and Voting Power

Politics without Positions: Party Loyalty and Voting Behavior in Malawi

In most countries there are meaningful issues over which politicians and voters take varying positions. Countless scholarly approaches to understanding political or voting behavior engage such policy preferences as a salient political cleavage, the most common of which places political actors on a left-right spectrum defined by opposing views on the role of government or the notions of liberal ...

How party nationalization conditions economic voting

In this article we analyze the conditioning effect of party nationalization, and in particular dynamic nationalization, on economic voting. While previous single-country and cross-national studies suggest a weak correlation between economic conditions and voting patterns, we argue that this relationship is conditioned by the degree to which parties are dynamically nationalized. Using both case ...

Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous...

Renegotiation of Asset Ownership

Asset reallocation is often observed in disintegration, divestures, and dissolution of business firms. Yet the property right theory of the firm assumes that asset ownership cannot be renegotiated when business relationships are severed. This paper shows that this assumption is quite innocuous: allowing renegotiation of asset ownership has essentially no effects on the