Party Organization and Electoral Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Electoral Competition after Party Splits
While party splits are a relatively frequent phenomenon in many new and established democracies, the systematic empirical research on electoral competition after schisms is limited. The analysis of more than 200 splits across 25 European countries in the post-war period addresses this gap in the literature. The study shows that the vote share of rump and splinter parties in the first election a...
متن کاملParty Platforms in Electoral Competition with Many Constituencies
This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters candidates from the two parties compete in Hotelling-Downs competition. Departing from party platform is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter’s preferred p...
متن کاملParty platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies
This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters. Departing from their parties’ platforms is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter’s preferred position in ev...
متن کاملTwo-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
Models of party competition building on Downs (1957) have recognized that there are centrifugal and centripetal forces in party competition; but one such force, the existence of party primaries, has been remarkably neglected in recent literature. We consider party/candidate policy divergence in two-party competition in one dimension where there is a two-stage electoral process, e.g., a primary ...
متن کاملElectoral poaching and party identification
This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of “party strength” based on the sizes and intensities of attachment of a party’s loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties’ strengths. In equilibrium, parties agg...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 2009
ISSN: 8756-6222,1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewp019