Partner selections in public goods games with constant group size
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size.
Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population...
متن کاملGeneralizations of Hamilton's rule applied to non-additive public goods games with random group size
*Correspondence: James A. R. Marshall, Department of Computer Science, Kroto Research Institute, University of Sheffield, Broad Lane, Sheffield S3 7HQ, UK e-mail: james.marshall@ sheffield.ac.uk Inclusive fitness theory has been described as being limited to certain special cases of social evolution. In particular some authors argue that the theory can only be applied to social interactions hav...
متن کاملCoalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect
Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size e¤ect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size e¤ect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and playerspreferences over public goods satisfy a condition called cardinal connectedness. More...
متن کاملPublic Goods Games
Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theo...
متن کاملPartner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a twoperson public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and comp...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review E
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1539-3755,1550-2376
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.80.026121