Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a twoperson public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and comp...
متن کاملRevisiting Confusion in Public Goods Experiments
Theories put forth to explain cooperation in public goods experiments usually assume either that subjects cooperate because they do not understand the game’s incentives or that cooperation stems from social motives such as altruism and reciprocity. Recent research by Andreoni (1995) is an important first attempt to distinguish the roles of confusion and social motives in these environments. How...
متن کاملCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the "sucker" in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that...
متن کاملPartner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a Public Goods Game
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers’ history of giving has a significant impact on the donor’s decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperati...
متن کاملPreferential Opponent Selection in Public Goods Games
This paper discusses preferential opponent selection in public goods games. It is shown that a preference to play with successful opponents strongly enhances the prevalence of cooperation. The finding is robust on spatial grids and heterogeneous networks. Importantly, I also demonstrate that positive opponent selection biases can evolve and become dominant in initially randomly mixed population...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Conflict Resolution
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0022-0027,1552-8766
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704264143