Partisan Differences in Swedish Macroeconomic Policy

Robustness and Macroeconomic Policy

This paper considers the design of macroeconomic policies in the face of uncertainty. In recent years, several economists have advocated that when policymakers are uncertain about the environment they face and find it difficult to assign precise probabilities to the alternative scenarios that may characterize this environment, they should design policies to be robust in the sense that they mini...

Macroeconomic Policy and Performance

Electoral Competition and Partisan Policy Feedbacks∗

We study dynamic electoral competition with partisan policy feedbacks (a situation in which a policy systematically affects the electorate’s future political preferences) in a public finance environment. Two parties with diverging preferences over redistribution choose socially undesirable levels of public employment because employment status systematically affects a citizen’s beliefs about red...

The Policy Views of Partisan Election Officials*

In the debate about partisan election administration, little attention has been focused on the views of local election officials. Election officials can be purveyors of partisanship as well as observers of the election administration environment. We use a series of national surveys of local election officials to examine the degree to which local officials of opposing parties have different poli...

Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles

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