Partial fishing mortality per fishing trip: a useful indicator of effective fishing effort in mixed demersal fisheries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Characterizing Fishing Effort and Spatial Extent of Coastal Fisheries
Biodiverse coastal zones are often areas of intense fishing pressure due to the high relative density of fishing capacity in these nearshore regions. Although overcapacity is one of the central challenges to fisheries sustainability in coastal zones, accurate estimates of fishing pressure in coastal zones are limited, hampering the assessment of the direct and collateral impacts (e.g., habitat ...
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Several research initiatives have been undertaken to map fishing effort at high spatial resolution using the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). An alternative to the VMS is represented by the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which in the EU became compulsory in May 2014 for all fishing vessels of length above 15 meters. The aim of this paper is to assess the uptake of the AIS in the EU fishi...
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Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishing firms that operate in their Exclusive Economic Zone. We develop a game-theoretical model in which a fishery owner maximizes the revenue that it collects from firms that operate in its EEZ by charging them a fishing fee. We find that if the number of firms is exogenous and finite the owner is likely to select a fee that is higher th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ICES Journal of Marine Science
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1095-9289,1054-3139
DOI: 10.1016/j.icesjms.2005.10.003