Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annual Review of Political Science
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1094-2939,1545-1577
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071105.104340