Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pareto Optimal Budgeted Combinatorial Auctions
This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with single-minded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation VCG, that is individually rational, incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG ...
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In the field of robust optimization uncertain data is modeled by uncertainty sets, i.e. sets which contain all relevant outcomes of the uncertain parameters. The complexity of the related robust problem depends strongly on the shape of the uncertainty set. Two popular classes of uncertainty are budgeted uncertainty and ellipsoidal uncertainty. In this paper we introduce a new uncertainty class ...
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The VCG mechanism is the gold standard for combinatorial auctions (CAs), and it maximizes social welfare. In contrast, the revenue-maximizing (aka optimal) CA is unknown, and designing one is NP-hard. Therefore, research on optimal CAs has progressed into special settings. Notably, Levin [1997] derived the optimal CA for complements when each agent’s private type is one-dimensional. (This does ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te2489