منابع مشابه
Exchangeable Equilibria, Part I: Symmetric Bimatrix Games
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players’ strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden variable. The set of these equilibria is convex and lies between the symmetric Nash equilibria and the symmetric correlated equilibria. The notion of exchangeable e...
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This thesis studies the application of geometric concepts and methods in the analysis of strategic-form games, in particular bimatrix games. Our focus is on three geometric concepts: the index, geometric algorithms for the computation of Nash equilibria, and polytopes. The contribution of this thesis consists of three parts. First, we present an algorithm for the computation of the index in deg...
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We consider the problem of computing additively approximate Nash equilibria in noncooperative two-player games. We provide a new polynomial time algorithm that achieves an approximation guarantee of 0.36392. We first provide a simpler algorithm, that achieves a 0.38197-approximation, which is exactly the same factor as the algorithm of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou.This algorithm is then ...
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In this paper, we introduce the notion of set of ε-proper equilibria for a bimatrix game. We define a 0–1 mixed quadratic program to generate a sequence of ε-proper Nash equilibria and show that the optimization results provide reliable indications on strategy profiles that could be used to generate proper equilibria analytically. This approach can be generalized in order to find at least one p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computers & Mathematics with Applications
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0898-1221
DOI: 10.1016/0898-1221(93)90277-3