Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow’s IIA. JEL Codes: D70, D71
متن کاملSocial choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identi ed by Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak pareto condition is imposed. Hence, under weak independence, both the Arrow (1951) and Wilson (1972) theorems vanish. We thank Goksel Asan, Irem Bozbay, Tugce ...
متن کاملGirth, minimum degree, independence, and broadcast independence
An independent broadcast on a connected graph $G$is a function $f:V(G)to mathbb{N}_0$such that, for every vertex $x$ of $G$, the value $f(x)$ is at most the eccentricity of $x$ in $G$,and $f(x)>0$ implies that $f(y)=0$ for every vertex $y$ of $G$ within distance at most $f(x)$ from $x$.The broadcast independence number $alpha_b(G)$ of $G$is the largest weight $sumlimits_{xin V(G)}f(x)$of an ind...
متن کاملDesign Creativity: Using Pareto Analysis and Genetic Algorithms to Generate and Evaluate Design Alternatives
When presented with a design problem, engineers, architects and visual-effects artists routinely generate multiple, competing design alternatives. Generating alternatives enables designers to explore the creative space along multiple parallel and orthogonal dimensions. This paper examines a new design practice called design optioneering, which uses parametric modeling, Pareto analysis and genet...
متن کاملOn the Robustness of Majority Rule
We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms—the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness—over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative t...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z