PARALLEL IMPORTS, MARKET SIZE AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVE
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive Compatible Collusion and Investment∗
We consider a two-stage model in which two firms first invest in R&D to reduce their marginal production costs, and then either compete or collude in the output market. When they collude, they bargain over a cartel agreement to divide the collusive profit. If bargaining breaks down, they revert to duopolistic competition. For both a location model and a linear demand model, we show that firms i...
متن کاملIncome Distribution, Market Size, and Foreign Direct Investment∗
This paper studies the role of the host country’s market size in the determination of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade flows in a general equilibrium model. We propose a simple model with non-homothetic consumer behavior where the distribution of income in the host country implies market segmentation. Facing a proximity-concentration trade-off, in equilibrium ex-ante identical firms ch...
متن کاملMarket Segmentation, Parallel Imports, and Incomplete Price Discrimination: The Welfare Effects of Regulations∗
We consider a regulated monopolist that faces a continuum of markets (e.g., [0, 1]) although a finite number k of prices must be charged. As a function of the integer k, we provide the optimal profit policy defined as the optimal market segmentation and the discriminatory prices. The social welfare is maximized for three prices, but the result is far below the benchmark, the welfare under the R...
متن کاملWholesale Price Discrimination and Parallel Imports
We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices could be higher t...
متن کاملIncentive Efficient Market Design∗
I study an environment with many competing uninformed sellers, one informed buyer, common values and exclusive contracts. I build on the seminal contributions of Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976), Myerson (1983) and Maskin-Tirole (1992) to construct a novel market mechanism, that combines signaling and screening features, and implements interim incentive efficient allocations as equilibria. In the mar...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Singapore Economic Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0217-5908,1793-6837
DOI: 10.1142/s0217590809003252