منابع مشابه
Pairwise kidney exchange: Comment
In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151–188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of allocations, including allowing three-way exchan...
متن کاملPairwise kidney exchange
In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely rst step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, bet...
متن کاملEgalitarian pairwise kidney exchange: fast algorithms vialinear programming and parametric flow
We revisit the pairwise kidney exchange problem established by Roth Sonmez and Unver [23]. Our goal, explained in terms of graph theory, is to find a maximum fractional matching on an undirected graph, that Lorenz-dominates any other fractional matching. The Lorenz-dominant fractional matching, which can be implemented as a lottery of integral matchings, is in some sense the fairest allocation ...
متن کاملKidney Exchange
Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made ...
متن کاملIncentivized Kidney Exchange∗
Within the last decade, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase the number of transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. In this paper, we propose a new scheme, incentivizing participation of compatible pairs in exchange via insurance for a future renal failure in the patient. Efficiency an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004