Pairing Games and Markets

Pairing Games and Markets∗

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargainin...

Strategic Thinking in Games and Markets

Adversarial Input in Games and Markets

We start by considering the trade-off between space and write overhead of flash memory. Every flash memory has additional space for wear leveling; we denote the space overhead with σ. Furthermore, every flash memory is forced to rewrite valid data when a block is erased; we denote the write overhead with ω. We show that space and write overhead are inversely proportional with σω ≥ 1. Our analys...

Large-Scale Optimization for Games and Markets

ion methods for dimensionality-reduction Abstractions methods are used to complement iterative algorithms for computing equilibria. Abstractions are usually created algorithmically, by utilizing domain-dependent structure to set up a manageable optimization problem that produces a smaller game which retains as much of the original game structure as possible. No reasonable bounds on solution qua...

From market games to real-world markets

This paper uses the development of multi-agent market models to present a unified approach to the joint questions of how financial market movements may be simulated, predicted, and hedged against. We first present the results of agent-based market simulations in which traders equipped with simple buy/sell strategies and limited information compete in speculatory trading. We examine the effect o...