منابع مشابه
Packing Non-Returning A-Paths
Chudnovsky et al. gave a min-max formula for the maximum number of node-disjoint non-zero A-paths in group-labeled graphs [1], which is a generalization of Mader’s theorem on node-disjoint A-paths [3]. Here we present a further generalization with a shorter proof. The main feature of Theorem 2.1 is that parity is “hidden” inside ν̂, which is given by an oracle for non-bipartite matching.
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In this paper we present an algorithmic approach to packing A-paths. It is regarded as a generalization of Edmonds’ matching algorithm, however there is the significant difference that here we do not build up any kind of alternating tree. Instead we use the so-called 3-way lemma, which either provides augmentation, or a dual, or a subgraph which can be used for contraction. The method works in ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Networks
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0028-3045,1097-0037
DOI: 10.1002/net.22000