Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Capital Structure of Non-Financial Firms of Pakistan
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information Management and Business Review
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2220-3796
DOI: 10.22610/imbr.v10i1.2146